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ABSTRAK 
 
Tujuan kajian ini adalah mengenalpasti risiko dan pulangan untuk strategi-strategi 
pelaburan Purata Kos-Ringgit berbanding Jumlah-Keseluruhan di dalam portfolio 
pasaran saham yang disenaraikan di Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur (BSKL).  BSKL 
adalah cekap dalam bentuk lemah dan harga sejarah tidak dapat digunakan sebagai 
panduan dalam meramal harga di masa hadapan.  Ketidakpastian di dalam ekonomi 
makro dan persekitaran global telah meningkatkan kemeruapan pasaran saham 
Malaysia dalam jangka masa sepuluh tahun yang lalu. Kebanyakan pemegang saham 
merupakan pelabur yang bersifat spekulasi dan ini telah menyebabkan ramalan rentak 
pasaran semakin sukar. Walaupun pada ketika ini banyak cara ataupun teknik telah 
wujud untuk meramal paras pasaran saham, ramai pelabur masih tidak percaya 
mereka berkemampuan untuk mengenalpasti masa yang tepat dalam membuat 
pelaburan dan meramalkan harga saham pada masa hadapan. Pelabur telah 
membangunkan beberapa cara untuk meminimumkan kesan dari penentuan masa di 
dalam pelaburan mereka melalui strategi seperti Purata Kos-Ringgit, pelaburan 
Jumlah-Keseluruhan, strategi Beli dan Pegang, Purata Nilai, Penunjuk dan Plan 
Formula.  Kajian dalam portfolio pasaran di BSKL mencadangkan Purata Kos-
Ringgit melalui taburan pelaburan dalam jangka masa panjang tidak dapat mengatasi 
strategi Jumlah-Keseluruahan di mana pelaburan dibuat pada suatu masa dan ketika. 
Kajian ini juga mendapati kedua-dua risiko dan purata pulangan meningkat dengan 
jangka masa pegangan untuk Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur.  Walaupun Purata Kos -
Ringgit adalah strategi yang tidak optimum, tetapi ia masih popular di kalangan 
pelabur kerana sifat tingkahlaku pelabur sendiri. 
 vii
ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the risk and return profile of the Dollar-
Cost Averaging versus Lump-Sum investment strategies in the market portfolio of 
stocks listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE).  KLSE is weak form 
efficient and historical prices cannot be used to predict future prices. Uncertainties in 
the macro economic and global environment have increased volatility in the 
Malaysian stock market for the past decade.  Majority of Malaysian shareholders who 
are speculators have made market timing even more difficult.  While there may be 
ways to identify when the market hits the bottom, many investors still do not believe 
they have the ability to correctly time the stock market movement and predict future 
stock prices.  Investors have developed ways to minimize the effects of timing in their 
investments through strategies like Dollar-Cost Averaging, Lump-Sum investment, 
Buy and Hold strategy, Value Averaging, Indexing and Formula Plans.  The study on 
the market portfolio of KLSE suggests that Dollar-Cost Averaging, which spreads an 
investment over time, may not be superior to the Lump-Sum strategy that invests a 
Lump-Sum at one point in time.  This study also finds that both risk and average 
return increase with the length of holding period for the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange.  While Dollar-Cost Averaging is a sub-optimal strategy, it is still popular 
among investors due to the behavioral characteristics of investors. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The study of the principles and practices of investments is concerned with the 
investors’ attempt to make logical investment decisions about alternatives that have 
varying degree of return and risk.  It is assumed that a typical investor does not like 
risks, defined as the possible loss of income or capital or the variability of expected 
return.  Investment return is expressed as the rate found by dividing the sum of 
investments into the income plus the capital gain or loss.  
 Local academic studies such as Lim (1980), Lanjong (1983), Laurence (1986), 
and Barnes (1986) on the KLSE finds that it is weak form efficient.  In other words, 
past price changes should be unrelated to future price changes.  The current price 
reflects all past market data and historical price information is of no value in assessing 
future share prices movements.  The price change today is unrelated to the changes 
yesterday or the day before.  If new information arrives randomly, the change in 
prices will also be random.  The KLSE is also subjects to certain market anomalies 
like calendar effect and “January Effect” (Yong, 1989; Zamri, 1998).  Macro 
economic and global changes have increased the volatility of the domestic stock 
market over the past decade.  Events such as the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in early 
1990, the ERM crisis, the sudden influx of short-term foreign funds during 1992/93 
super bull run, the PESO crisis in mid-1990, the Asian currency crisis in 1997 which 
started with the devaluation of Baht, the burst of the US technology bubble in 2000, 
the September 11 incident and the accounting scandals of huge empires like Enron 
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have shown how vulnerable the Malaysian stock market is to external shocks which 
occurred randomly. 
  While there may be claims that investors could identify the market bottoms 
and highs, many investors still do not believe that they have the ability to time the 
stock market and predict the future prices.  Findings by Kon and Jen (1979) and 
Henriksson (1984) have shown little evidence that fund managers had consistent 
timing abilities.  Therefore, investors have developed ways to minimize the effects of 
timing in their investments through strategies like Dollar-Cost Averaging, Lump-Sum 
investment, Buy and Hold strategy, Value Averaging, Indexing and Formula Plans. 
 Dollar-Cost Averaging requires an individual to spread an investment outlay at 
regular intervals, such as every week, month or quarter.  Dollar-Cost Averaging 
enable investor to end up purchasing more shares when prices fall and fewer shares 
when prices rise.  Dollar-Cost Averaging is a simple, forced savings plan that results 
in lower transaction costs than a plan that requires frequent portfolio rebalancing and 
allows investors to hedge against regret that results from investing a Lump-Sum 
during a market high.  Lump-Sum investing requires investor to invest all funds at one 
time.  For example, if an investor has RM10,000 available to spend, he purchases 
RM10,000 worth of assets now, leaves the investment dollars in place, and computes 
the return earned on this investment over a given period of time. 
Dollar-Cost Averaging is widely recognized by personal investment and 
academic financial literature as a way to increase return and reduce risk.  This strategy 
is believed to guarantee the investor does not invest his entire sum at a market high 
and thus regrets his investment decision ex-post.  Since Constantinides (1979) 
demonstrated that Dollar -Cost Averaging plans are suboptimal theoretically compared 
to Lump-Sum because its practice is inconsistent with standard finance, Rozeff (1994) 
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in his empirical study on the S&P 500 and a small firm portfolio in United States has 
also shown similar findings.  The terminal wealth theory, briefly defined as expected 
return generated from certain investment horizon also supports Lump-Sum investment 
that has a higher ending wealth compared with Dollar-Cost Averaging.  While Dollar-
Cost Averaging may be a suboptimal strategy, it is still popular among investors due 
to the behavioral characteristics of investors.  Statman (1995) concluded that investors 
are risk averse, may be reluctant to commit all available funds at one time since the 
investment may occur at a high market and it minimizes regret.  Kahneman and 
Tversky (1980)’s findings showed that people (investors) are generally risk averse 
and do not like uncertainties. 
This study seeks to examine the risk and return for the Dollar -Cost Averaging 
versus Lump-Sum investment in the market portfolio of stocks listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange.  The period examined is from January 1992 to January 2002 
and data used consists of the closing Emas Index for the first trading day of each 
month.  The 3-months Fixed Deposit rates of a foreign bank in Malaysia for the same 
period are also used as the investment rate for the un-invested portion of the fund for 
Dollar-Cost Averaging strategy.  The period from January 1992 to January 2002 
covered both bull and bear markets and also periods of high and low interest rates in 
Malaysia.  This study is based on Rozeff (1994)’s research methodology on Dollar-
Cost Averaging versus Lump-Sum strategy in the monthly S&P 500 Index and a 
small firm portfolio for the period from 1926 to 1990.   
 
1.2 Research Questions  
1) Can investors time the market with the occurrence of market efficiency 
and anomalies? 
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2) Can we develop alternative solutions to timing? 
3) Is Dollar-Cost Averaging superior than Lump-Sum as a result of investors 
being risk-averse? 
4) Will the success of Dollar-Cost Averaging and Lump-Sum determined by 
seasonality? 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this study are to 
1) compare the average return and risk (as measured by the standard 
deviation of returns) in employing the Lump-Sum strategy versus the 
Dollar-Cost Averaging strategy on the market portfolio of stocks listed on 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
2) explore the trend of average return and standard deviation with the length 
of the holding period for both strategies. 
3) Compare the success of Lump-Sum strategy with Dollar-Cost Averaging 
strategy during different months. 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
It is hoped that using the results of this study, investors will be able to assess whether 
the Dollar-Cost Averaging strategy is superior to Lump-Sum strategy for investment 
in stocks listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE).  The results also could 
shed some lights on the implication on theories such as market efficiency and 
behavior finance, and practical investment. 
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1.5 Organization of the Chapters 
This study is organized into five chapters.  Chapter 1 introduces the subject matter, 
discusses research questions, states the objective and explains the usefulness of this 
study.  It is aimed at comparing the average return and risk by employing the Lump-
Sum strategy versus the Dollar-Cost Averaging strategy on the market portfolio of 
stock listed on the KLSE.  The remaining chapters have been organized in the 
following manner, Chapter 2 reviews previous studies and their findings on 
behavioral framework, market efficiency, market anomalies, timing the market, and 
alternatives solution to time the markets. The review will serve to compare and 
contrast the findings in the past researches on Dollar-Cost Averaging strategy with 
Lump-Sum strategy.  Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology, which covers the 
discussion on data selection, return of investment formulation, formalization of 
hypotheses for testing, and statistical analyses deployed.  Chapter 4 presents various 
analyses of data selected and the respective findings.  Last but not least, Chapter 5 
concludes the study, discusses survey findings, provide implication for investors, 
highlights some limitations, and gives some suggestions for future studies in this field.  
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews the relevant literature that forms the basis of this study. To 
understand the related knowledge on the subject of the study, the literature survey 
encompasses previous research studies on behavioral framework, market efficiency, 
market anomalies, timing the market, and alternatives solution to time the markets. 
Dollar-Cost Averaging and Lump-Sum strategies have been selected for this study.  
The review will serve to compare and contrast the findings in the past researches on 
Dollar-Cost Averaging strategy with Lump-Sum strategy. A summary of Emas Index 
and Fixed Deposit interest rate movement from 1992 to 2002 were also discussed in 
this study.  Lastly, a summary of this chapter and an overview of the subsequent 
chapter is presented. 
 
2.2 Behavioral Framework 
Jones (1996) defines an investment as the commitment of funds to one or more assets 
that will be held over some future time period.   Inves tment is concerned with the 
management of an investor’s wealth, that is the sum of current income and the present 
value of all future income.  Investors invest to improve welfare that can be defined as 
monetary wealth, both current and future.  Funds to be invested come from assets 
already owned, borrowed money and savings or foregone consumption.  By foregoing 
consumption today and investing the savings, investors expect to enhance their future 
consumption possibilities by increasing their wealth.  Investors also seek to manage 
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their wealth effectively by obtaining the most from it while protecting it from 
inflation, taxes and other factors. Specifically, they must decide when to invest, what 
assets to acquire, how much of their wealth to invest in those assets and for what 
future periods to hold those assets.  Making and implementing such decisions is here 
referred to as the process of investing. 
Two psychologists, Daniel Kahneman of University of California at Berkeley 
and Amos Tversky of Stanford, in the 1980’s carried out research into human 
decision-making processes regarding risk.  The report on this research appeared in the 
“The 1987 Investor’s Guide”, Fortune Magazine.  Although their efforts have not 
focused on investors in particular, many of their findings aptly refer to the decisions 
of investors constantly make.  Kahneman and Tversky (1987) have conducted 
elaborate psychological tests with subjects who were asked to choose between 
different pairs of risks and rewards.  From these tests, there emerged a new 
understanding of how people assess the probabilities of gains and losses.  Most people 
are bothered by the 20% chance of getting nothing in the second choice which tells 
psychologists what stock market theorists believe all along, that is, investors like 
certainty, or in other words, are risk-averse. 
 Shefrin (2000) defines loss aversion as people tend to feel losses much more 
acutely than they feel gains of comparable magnitude. Statman (1995), who argues 
that investors not wanting to experience “regret” and would choose to keep their 
holdings in cash rather than suffer the pain of regret that will come if stock prices 
declines.    
For the above reason, investor is said to be risk averse.  Why do risk-averse 
individual or institutions invest? Whether investors are individual or institutions, they 
are likely to choose an investment that offers the highest return with the lowest risk.  
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It is assumed that investors attempt to maximize wealth that is accomplished through 
the process of maximizing return and minimizing risk.  There appears to be direct 
correlation between return and risk, that is the higher the reward, the higher the risk.  
Therefore, the investor should attempt to keep the risk associated with the return 
proportional.  Seeking excessive risk does not ensure excessive return.  Not all 
securities with a given level of return have the same degree of risk.  
 As such, Dollar-Cost Averaging is more attractive to people who prefer 
multiple bets to one-shot risk (Lump-Sum) and it can mitigate loss aversion (Shefrin, 
2000).  Moreover, as Statman (1995) argues, financial loss is usually accompanied by 
regret.  Lump-Sum investors are likely to blame themselves more than Dollar-Cost 
Averaging investors if the stock takes a dive shortly after they bought it.    
 
2.3 Market Efficiency 
An efficient market is a market in which the price of securities fully reflect all know 
information quickly and on average accurately.  This concept postulates that investors 
will assimilate all relevant information into prices in making their buy and sell 
decisions.  Therefore, the current price of a stock reflects all know information, 
including not only past information but also current information as well as events that 
have been announced but are still forthcoming such as stock split and bonus issues.  
Furthermore, information that can reasonably be inferred is also assumed to be 
reflected in price.  For example, if investors believe that interest rates will decline 
soon, prices will reflect this belief before the actua l decline occurs.  The early 
literature on market efficiency assumes that the market prices incorporate new 
information instantaneously.  The modern version of market efficiency does not 
require that the adjustment be literally instantaneously, only that it occur very quickly 
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as information becomes known.  The Efficient Market Hypothesis states that the 
adjustment in prices resulting from information is “unbiased”.   
Jones (1996) concluded that the market could be expected to be efficient if the 
following events occur: 
1) A large number of rational, profit-maximizing investors exists who actively 
participate in the market by analyzing, valuing and trading stocks.  These 
investors are price takers; that is one participant alone cannot affect the price 
of a security. 
2) Information is costless and widely available to market participants at 
approximately the same time. 
3) Information is generated in a random fashion such that announcements are 
basically independent of one another. 
4) Investors react quickly and fully to the new information, causing stock prices 
to adjust accordingly. 
These conditions may seem strict.  There is no question that a large number of 
investors are constantly “playing the game”.  Both individuals and institutions follow 
the market closely on daily basis and ready to buy or sell when they think is 
appropriate.  The total amount of money at their disposal at any one time is more than 
enough to adjust prices at the margin.  Although the production of information is not 
costless, for institutions in the investment business, generating various types of 
information is a necessary cost of business and many participants receive it easily.  It 
is widely available to many participants at approximately the same time as 
information is reported on radio, television and specialized communications devices 
now available to any investor willing to pay for such devices.  Information is largely 
generated in a random fashion in the sense that most investors cannot predict when 
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companies will announce significant new developments like when wars will break 
out, when strikes will occur, when currencies will be devalued and so forth.  Although 
there is some dependence on information events over the time, by and large 
announcements are independent and occur more or less randomly.  Security prices 
will adjust very quickly to reflect random information coming into the market. 
Furthermore, price changes are independent of one another and move in a random 
fashion.  Today’s price change is independent of the one yesterday because it is based 
on investor’s reactions to new, independent information coming into the market 
today. 
In a perfectly efficient market, security prices always reflect immediately all 
available information and investors are not able to use available information to earn 
abnormal returns because it already impounded in prices.  In such a market, every 
security’s price is equal to its intrinsic value, which reflects all information about that 
security’s prospects.  If some types of information are not fully reflected in prices or 
lags exist in the impoundment of information into prices, the market is less than 
perfectly efficient. In fact, the market is not perfectly efficient and it is certainly not 
grossly inefficient, so it is the question of degree.   
 Fama (1970) discuss efficient market in the form of Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, which is simply the formal statement of market efficiency. It is concerned 
with the extent to which security prices quickly and fully reflect the different types of 
available information. Weak-form is the part of the Efficient Market Hypothesis that 
states that prices reflect all price and volume data.  The correct implication of a weak-
form efficient market is that the past history of price information is of no value in 
assessing future changes in price.   
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2.3.1 Evidence on Market Efficiency 
Weak-form efficiency means that price data are incorporated into current stock prices.  
If prices follow nonrandom trends, stock price changes are dependent; otherwise, they 
are independent.  Therefore, weak-form tests involve the question of whether all 
information contained in the sequence of past prices is fully reflected in the current 
price.  The weak-form Efficient Market Hypothesis is related to, but not identical with 
an idea from the 1960s caled the random walk hypothesis.  If prices follow a random 
walk, price changes over time are random and independent.  The price change for 
today is unrelated to the price change yesterday or the day before or any other day.  If 
new information arrives randomly in the market and investors react to it immediately, 
changes in prices will also be random.  Stock price changes in an efficient market 
should be independent.  Fama (1965) studied the daily returns on the 30 Dow Jones 
Industrial stocks and found that only a very small percentage of any successive price 
change could be explained by a prior change.  This suggest that price changes are 
independent and the implication is that knowing and using past sequence of price 
information is of no value to an investor.  Fama (1991) found that stock prices were 
adjusted efficiently to firm-specific information such as dividend changes, changes in 
capital structure, and corporate control transactions. In addition, the stock-price 
reactions to private information were small, and predictability of stock prices from 
past return and other variables were short on precision.   
 Evidence of market efficiency could also be observed in studies on stock 
market overreaction.  Debondt and Thaler (1985) have tested an “overreaction 
hypothesis”, which states that people overreact to unexpected and dramatic new 
events.  As applied to stock prices, the hypothesis states that, as a result of 
overreaction, “loser” portfolios outperform the market after their formation.  Debondt 
and Thaler (1985) found that over half-century period, the loser portfolios of 35 
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stocks outperformed the market by an average of almost 20% for a 36-months period 
after portfolio formation.  Winner portfolios earned about 5% less than the market.  
Interestingly, the overreaction seems to occur mostly during the second and third year 
of test period.  They interpreted this evidence as indicative of irrational behavior by 
investors or “overreaction”.  This indicates substantial weak-form inefficiencies 
because overreaction hypothesis is predictive.  In other words, according to their 
research, knowing past stock returns appears to help significantly in predicting future 
stock prices and it is in a way that weak-form contra evidence.  
Do market anomalies appear to be contrary to an efficient market?  Market 
anomalies are phenomenon that appears to be contrary to an efficient market. By 
definition, an anomaly is an exception to a rule or model.  In other words, these 
anomalies are in contrast to what would be expected in a totally efficient market, and 
they cannot easily be explained away.  Investors must be cautious in viewing any of 
these anomalies as a stock selection device guaranteed to outperform the market.  
There is no such guarantee because empirical tests of these anomalies may not 
approximate actual trading strategies that would be followed by investors.  
Furthermore, if anomalies exist and can be identified, investors should still hold a 
portfolio of stocks rather than concentrating on a few stocks identified by one of these 
methods.  Among the more well-documented anomalies are the size effect, the 
January effect and other calendar effect. 
One well-known anomaly is the firm size effect.  Banz (1981) discovered that 
stocks of small New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) firms’ earned higher risk adjusted 
returns than stocks of large NYSE firms.  The size effect appears to have persisted for 
over 40 years. He attributed the results to a misspecification of the CAPM rather than 
to market inefficiency.  That is, in the face of  persistent abnormal returns attributed to 
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the size effect, Banz (1981) is unwilling to reject the idea that market could have 
inefficiencies of this type.  Addition research by Keim (1983) on the size effect 
indicates that “small” firms with the largest abnormal returns tend to be those that 
have recently become small (or have recently declined in prices), that either pay no 
dividend or have a high dividend yield, that have low prices and low P/E ratios.  He 
found out that roughly 50% of return difference reported is concentrated in January.  
Numerous studies in the past have suggested that seasonality exists in the 
stock market.  Keim (1983) studied the month-to-month stability of the size effect for 
all NYSE and AMEX firms with data for 1963 to 1979.  His findings again supported 
the existence of a significant size effect.  However, roughly half of this size effect 
occurred in January and more than half of the excess January returns occurred during 
the first five trading days of the month.  The first trading day of the year showed a 
high small firm premium for every year of the period studied.  The strong 
performance in January by small company stocks has become known as the January 
effect.  Keim (1986) documented once again the abnormal returns for small firms in 
January.  He found a yield effect – the largest abnormal returns tended to accrue to 
firms either paying no dividends or having high dividends yields.  
 The information about a possible January effect has been available for years 
and has been widely discussed in press.  The question arises, therefore, as to why a 
January effect would persists and reoccur again and again.  A recent study of the 
January effect by Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) indicates that the previous studies of 
abnormal returns for small firms may be biased by incomplete consideration of a price 
effect and transaction costs.  On the basis of the years 1967 to 1986, this study argues 
that the January effect is a low-price phenomenon rather than a small firm effect; 
there is a stable and strong low-price January in each of these 20 years.  Further tests 
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indicated that, after adjusting for differential transaction costs, portfolios of lower 
price stocks almost always under-performed the market portfolio.  Therefore, the 
large before-transaction-costs excess January returns observed on low-price stocks 
may be explained by higher transaction costs and a bid-ask bias.  The implication of 
this study is that the reported January anomaly is not persistent and is not likely to be 
exploited by most investors. 
 Branch (1977) proposed a unique trading rule for taking advantage of tax 
selling.  Investors tend to engage in tax selling at the end of the year to establish 
losses on stocks that have declined.  After the New Year, there is a tendency to 
reacquire these stocks or to buy other stocks that look attractive.  This scenario would 
produce downward pressure on stock prices in late November and December and 
positive pressure in early January.  Those who believe in efficient markets would not 
expect such a seasonal pattern to persist; arbitragers who would buy in December and 
sell in January should eliminate it.  Dyl (1977) supported the tax-selling hypothesis 
when he found that December trading volume was abnormally high for stocks that 
had declined during the previous year and that volume was abnormally low for stocks 
that had experienced large gains.  He found significant abnormal returns during 
January for stocks that had experienced losses during the prior year. 
Although not as significant as the January anomaly, several other “calendar” 
effects have been examined, including the Chinese New Year (CNY) effect, the 
monthly effect, the weekend/day-of-the-week effect, and the intraday effect.  Zamri 
(1998) has concluded that CNY effect plays a very important role in explaining high 
returns surrounding the turn-of-the western year in Chinese-dominated market of 
KLSE.  This result is consistent with Yong (1989) and Wong et al. (1990) findings.  
There are also evidence that in the study of monthly effect, al the market’s 
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cumulative advance occurred during the first half of trading months.  The weekend 
effect has been documented by French (1980), and by Gibbons and Hess (1981).  
French (1980) found that the mean return for Monday was significantly negative 
during 5-year sub-periods and during the full period.  In contrast, the average return 
for the other four days was positive.  Gibbons and Hess (1981)  likewise found 
negative returns on Monday for individual stocks and Treasury bills.  The Monday 
effect was similar for different size firms that were exchange-traded or OTC.  
 
2.4 Can Investors Time the Market?  
With the past findings on market efficiencies and anomalies as explained above, can 
we really time the market? Timing is clearly an important aspect of the investing 
process.  Buying and selling at the right time is as important as being able to select 
good stocks.  Unfortunately, buying at the bottom and selling at the top is very seldom 
accomplished except by chance.     
Kon and Jen (1979) investigated the relationship between timing, selectivity 
and market efficiency as compared to the investment performance of mutual funds.  
Of the 37 funds examined, 25 had exhibited positive estimated selectivity, of which 5 
were statistically significant at 95% confidence.  They suggested that there was 
evidence that the funds as a group exhibited an ability to generate positive selection 
performance.  Kon (1983) also evaluated the timing of the mutual funds.  Of the 37 
funds, 14 had positive overall timing performance estimates, but none was statistically 
significant at 95% confidence.  Kon (1983) concluded that mutual fund managers 
should rely on their skills of stock selection and not try to time the market. 
 Henriksson (1984) conducted another empirical investigation on market 
timing and mutual fund performance.  He did not find any evidence of a consistent 
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timing ability.  Of the 116 funds sampled over the period of February 1968 through 
May 1980, only 3 had statistically significant positive estimates of timing ability.  In 
contrasts, 9 funds had negative timing estimates that were statistically significant. 
 Kester (1990) examined the comparative potential gains and required 
predictive ability of marketing timing asset mix decisions in the United States and 
Singapore based on historical returns data over the period from 1975 to 1988.  He 
concluded that at 2% transaction cost level, the required predictive ability in both the 
United States and Singapore is probably beyond the reach of most investors. 
 Price (1987) examined the potential rewards and risks from timing decisions 
involving financial assets in the United States.  Table 2.1 shows the average annual 
rates of return, calculated over the period from 1926 to 1983, for the market timing 
versus buy-and-hold strategy, with a 1% commission on each transaction.  Market 
timing as conducted in the study involved the transferring of funds between common 
stocks and treasury bills.  In order to be successful at market timing relative to a buy-
and-hold strategy in the United States, the study suggested that an investor must 
correctly forecast market movements over the 50% of the time and less accurate 
forecasts result in greatly diminished returns. 
 
Table 2.1  
Annual return by buy-and-hold strategy 
Market Timing Accuracy Average Annual Return (%) 
100% 18.2% 
70% 12.1% 
50% 8.1% 
Buy-and-hold with no timing decisions 11.8% 
Source: Price (1987) - Average annual return for market timing versus buy -and -hold strategy in the US, 1926 - 1983 
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2.5 Alternatives Solutions to Timing 
Many investors do not believe they have the ability to make profit from stocks 
trading.  They stress quality and selectivity and develop ways to minimize the effects 
of timing. 
Amling (1989) recommended typical solutions to the timing problem.  These 
are done by using the Dollar-Cost Averaging, formula plan and indexing approaches. 
 
2.5.1 Dollar-Cost Averaging 
 Dollar-Cost Averaging is considered to be a better averaging technique because it 
involves buying stock at a price lower than the average of the market trend, even 
though the market moves upward in a cyclical fashion.  With Dollar-Cost Averaging, 
the investor buys the same dollar amount of stock at regular time periods.  As the 
market declines, the investor is able to buy more shares of stock with a fixed number 
of dollars.  If the stock moves up in price, the investor buys a smaller number of 
shares.   
The advantages of Dollar -Cost Averaging are as follows: 
1) It relieves investor from the pressure in timing stock purchases.  It works best 
when stock is acquired in a declining market and reduces the average cost per 
share and improves the possibility of gain over long-term.  
2) It forces the investor to plan an investment program more thoroughly as 
compared to a Lump-Sum commitment made at one time. 
3) It provides the periodic and continuous review of the investor’s portfolio and 
objectives. 
4) It eliminates the cyclical characteristics of a stock but retains the trend of 
growth over time. 
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5) It reduces timing risks associated with the market. Many investors make 
incorrect guesses about the future course of the stock market, which can lead 
to poorly timed investment decision.  Since its program ensures that you are 
investing continuously, you will never choose the “wrong” time to invest 
(Patrick, 1996).   
However, there are also some disadvantages of Dollar-Cost Averaging. 
1) It increases the cost involved in purchasing the stock at several different times 
rather than at one time. 
2) The investor may be unwilling to carry on the averaging program especially 
when the stock begins to drop. 
3) It attempts to solve buy timing issue but it does not call attention to the 
problem of the timing of the sales of the securities that have been purchased.  
Dollar-Cost Averaging assumes that once stock is purchased, they will be sold 
infrequently.  There is an advantage in holding securities of quality companies 
but once the company’s basic status changed, we should act. 
 
2.5.2 Formula Plans 
By not telling the investor when to sell, Dollar-Cost Averaging does not emphasize 
sufficiently the fundamental problem of the investment-management equation – 
bluntly stated as the buy low sell high concept.   If investors were perfect in their 
judgment of the market and market conditions, they would buy low and sell high.  
This process requires a great deal of patience and fortitude.  It is generally full of 
pitfalls and errors in judgment.   
 The buy low sell high concept is excellent but difficult to employ, particularly 
for the small investor.  A systematic approach is needed to produce results 
comparable to those of a skilled investor to generate a good judgment on buying low 
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and selling high; yet the approach must be automatic, so that once it is established, the 
person with only a modest skill in investment timing will be able to carry out the 
investment successfully.  Programs that provide an automatic timing device to guide 
the buy and sell transactions on a prearranged plan to simulate good management are 
referred to as formula plans. 
In a formula plan, a certain percentage of the investor’s portfolio will be 
invested in fixed-income securities or cash and a certain percentage in common stock.  
The exact amount invested in each depends on the height of the stock market at the 
time the investor begins the plan.  It is not uncommon for investor to follow a 
balanced-fund approach when 50% are invested in bonds and 50% are invested in 
common stocks.  At the time the portfolio is established, an attempt should be made to 
determine the relative height of the stock market.  If the market is relatively high, a 
greater percentage of the investment fund should be in fixed income types of 
securities and cash, perhaps a ratio of 70% fixed and 30% stock.  If on the other hand, 
the market is low, then one could reverse proportions. 
When the market moves higher, the proportion of common stock in the 
portfolio either remains the same or it declines.  When the market declines, the 
common stock either remains the same or it increases.  These changes simply 
recognize that a portfolio should be more aggressive when the market is low and more 
defensive when the market is high.  Formula plan also requires that stock be bought 
and sold when a significant change occurs in the price of the securities owned by the 
investor.  A significant change in the level of the market as measured by a leading 
stock market index, such as Dow Jones Industrial Average, or Standard & Poor’s 500 
Index might also signal a change.  The time period between purchase and sale will 
depend on the movement of the market or the securities owned.  
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The advantages include: 
1) Once the plan is established, the investor is free from making emotional 
decisions based on the current attitudes of other investors in the stock market. 
2) Most effort and discussion about timing is concerned with buying securities.  
The formula plans stresses both buying and selling. 
3) It recognizes the defensive and aggressive characteristics of an investment 
portfolio.  As market moves up, the formula plan results in an increasingly 
defensive position while when the market decline, the portfolio automatically 
becomes more aggressive. 
The disadvantages include: 
1) Investors must make a value judgment as to the relative height of the stock 
market to increase or decrease holding common stock 
2) Over a sustained market rise, investors would be better off in common stock 
than in a combination of bonds and common stock. 
3) Investors might choose securities that do not move with the market, as the beta 
characteristics of common stocks are not entirely stable. 
4) It offers only modest opportunity for capital gains. 
 
2.5.3 Indexing 
Many people think that they must do as good if not better than the market if they are 
to be successful investors.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to do better than the market.  
Therefore, many investors would be willing to do as well as the market by earning the 
return of the market and accepting the risk of the market.  The market consists of 
usually some market index such as S&P 500 Index.  In order to “get the market”, an 
investor would purchase all the stocks in the index based on the proportion of each in 
the index.  The unfortunate part about indexing is the large number of companies the 
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investor must own to obtain the results of the market average.  For instance, there are 
30 DJIA stocks and 500 stocks in the S&P Index.  Only large institutions would be 
able to do so and it appears to be a weak alternative for investor with limited funds. 
 
2.5.4 Value Averaging 
Several researchers have compared Dollar-Cost Averaging to alternative investment 
techniques.  Edleson (1988) introduces an alternative scheduled investment strategy, 
value averaging.  Value averaging requires an investor to increase the value of his 
portfolio by a total dollar amount each period.  As a result, the dollar contribution 
each period varies depending on the return for the investment in the previous period.  
In periods of negative returns, investors have to increase the total dollar contribution.  
Yet, over an extended investing horizon, if the investment returns are positive, the 
investor may need to disinvest in order to reduce the value of the portfolio to the 
required increase level.  Edelson (1988) finds investors are better off with a value 
averaging investment strategy rather than with a Dollar-Cost Averaging strategy.  
 Value averaging allows investors to take advantage of price fluctuations and 
increase purchases when prices are low and decrease or stop purchases when stock 
prices are high.  Individuals using value averaging are concerned with increasing the 
cumulative value of their investment by a set amount each period.  For example, let’s 
say an investor wants to increase the value of his portfolio by RM1,000 each month.  
The individual invests RM1,000 and earns 2% the first month.  The investment is now 
worth RM1,020.  For the second month, the individual wants the total value invested 
to be RM2,000 so he adds an additional RM980 (RM2,000 – RM1,020) to the 
account.  Alternatively, if the first month’s investment of RM1,000 had lost 5%, the 
second month the individual needs to invest RM1,050 (RM2,000 – RM950).  Value 
averaging is most suited for volatile investments, since individual essentially “buys 
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low, sells high”.  It requires a high degree of discipline on the part of the investor to 
stick with the strategy.  It also requires the resources to increase contributions after a 
period of negative returns.   
 
2.5.5 Buy-and-Hold 
Thorley (1994) compares the Dollar-Cost Averaging strategy to a buy and hold 
investment strategy.  He notes that investment advisers sell the Dollar-Cost Averaging 
strategy to clients since the scheduled savings plan helps individuals avoid the 
temptation to consume earnings.  The study finds that Dollar-Cost Averaging leads to 
a reduction in expected returns and an increase in risk compared with buy and hold 
strategy. 
 With buy and hold strategy, an individual places some portion of his wealth in 
risky assets and the remaining portion of his wealth is held in less risky assets such as 
treasury bills.  The investment dollars remain in the original distribution for some 
period of time; then the overall return for the investing strategy is calculated.  For 
example, if an investor has RM10,000 to invest, he may choose to place 50% of his 
wealth in a market index fund and hold the remaining 50% of his wealth in treasury 
bills.  He does not adjust his position and at the end of the year, he calculates the 
return of his portfolio.   
This strategy requires an investor to determine assets of interest up front and 
use a portion of the available funds to purchase some percentage of risky assets.  No 
addit ional transactions are required during the investment time period.  A 
disadvantage of this strategy is that the risk of the portfolio increases over time.  The 
risk premium associated with an investment in a market fund assures, on average, that 
the percentage of total wealth in the risky asset will increase relative to the wealth 
allocated to the risk free asset over time.  Investors typically determine an optimal 
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level of risk to be achieved over time.  They either invest in the risky asset originally 
knowing that the percentage of total wealth in risky assets will grow throughout the 
life of the investment, or they partition the investment dollars in the optimal mix of 
risky and risk-free assets up front and watch the riskiness of the portfolio increase.  
Either strategy results in a sub-optimal distribution of the investor’s wealth during the 
life of the investment. 
 
2.6 Strategies Selection for the Study 
Due to the unpredictability of the KLSE performance, any attempt to time the market 
would be akin making a guess or even worse.  In that case, one of the more popular 
questions investors are asking is, “Is it better to feed money into the market over time 
or to invest it all at once?”.  Another way of framing the question is, “Which is better 
– Dollar-Cost Averaging or Lump-Sum?”.  Therefore, Dollar -Cost Averaging and 
Lump-Sum have been selected for evaluating investment performance in the KLSE in 
this study.       
 
2.7 Dollar-Cost Averaging Strategy 
Dollar-Cost Averaging is widely promoted by personal investment as a way to 
increase return and reduce risk.  Personal finance literature for example Goodman and 
Bloch (1994) and financial radio programs are repleted with references to an 
investment technique Dollar-Cost Averaging where a fixed amount of money is 
invested at fixed intervals rather than investing the money all at once in what is 
commonly known as Lump-Sum strategy.  According to many personal finance 
books, the Dollar-Cost Averaging system reduces risk and enhances return.  Goodman 
 24 
and Bloch (1994) suggest that a Dollar-Cost Averaging strategy is superior to Lump-
Sum strategy in up markets and down markets.  The logic of such claim is that as 
market withdraws, investors gain by buying more shares with their fixed investment 
and the assumed result is a lower cost per share and increased return.  Dollar-Cost 
Averaging is a simple, forced savings plan that results in lower transaction costs than 
with a formula plan that requires frequent portfolio rebalancing.  It allows investors to 
hedge against regret that results from investing a Lump-Sum during a market high. 
 Mandell and O’Brien (1992) mentioned that one of the arguments used for 
Dollar-Cost Averaging is that investor do not regret a market decline since a portion 
of the funds will be purchasing shares at a relatively low price and if the market goes 
up, the investor is not unhappy because of the appreciation of the funds already 
committed even though he is buying high.  They stated that there are benefits for the 
investor in diversifying over time by dividing up a sum and spreading that over time.  
However, they cautioned about three costs.  The first is the transaction cost which 
increases as a percentage of investment as the size of investment decreases.  The 
second is the opportunity costs of holding the un-invested portion in a risk-free asset 
such as bank account until it is time to invest it.  The opportunity cost is equivalent to 
the risk premium on the security that the investor intends to purchase.  The third cost 
is the lack of portfolio balance caused by a rigid investment scheme. 
 Johnson (1983) stated that Dollar-Cost Averaging is relatively simple yet 
generally effective to minimize the risk of incorrect timing and it uses time 
diversification, which is the practice of periodically spacing purchases and sales of a 
security over time.  He mentioned that Dollar-Cost Averaging is best suited for 
investors who have regular funds available for purchasing securities, who have little 
